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INTRODUCTION 
This appeal places three sets of issues before the Court: (1) the proper 
interpretation of the Clark Easement; (2) the admissibility of certain evidence; and (3) 
the fairness of Judge Harding's rush to judgment in denying Fox Ridge's Rule 56(f) 
motions. Fox Ridge presents argument on each of these issues below. 
ARGUMENT 
L JUDGE HARDING'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT RULINGS SHOULD 
BE REVERSED. 
A. Fox Ridge's Interpretation of the Clark Easement is Reasonable, 
and PacifiCorp's Interpretation is Not, 
An casement is ambiguous as a matter of law if it is capable of more than one 
reasonable interpretation. Sec Ward v. Interniountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 
269 (Utah 1995). Thus, if Fox Ridge's interpretation of the Clark Easement is 
reasonable, then, at a minimum, there is ambiguity as to what the parties intended and 
it was error for Judge Harding to grant summary judgment in favor of PacifiCorp. 
See Plateau Mining Company v. Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 
720, 725 (Utah 1990). Further, if PacifiCorp's interpretation of the Clark Easement is 
unreasonable, it likewise also was error for Judge Harding to deny Fox Ridge's 
motion for summary judgment Sec, eg , R&R Energies v Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 
936 P2d 1068, 1074-77 (Utah 1997) (cited in PacifiCorp\s Brief at 16). While the 
inlei pi elation of unambiguous contiacts is a question of law, Plateau Mining, 802 
P 2d at 725, the fact that the parties have both uiged the Court to find the Clark 
1 
Easement to be unambiguous does not mean issues of fact do not exist. Id. Rather, 
the cross motions must be viewed only as showing that each party contends there is 
lack of ambiguity under its own theory, but not as a concession that no dispute 
remains under its adversary's theory. See Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 
P.2d 821, 825 (Utah 1989). 
Fox Ridge urges the following three points of interpretation of the Clark 
Easement: 
(1) The parties intended the words "two pole" and "three pole" structures 
to refer to the particular type of structures UP&L actually erected on the Fox Ridge 
property. 
(2) In striking the word "towers" and replacing it with the word 
"structures," the parties1 intended to exclude steel towers that would plape a burden 
on the servient estate exceeding that imposed by the permitted two and three pole 
structures. 
(3) The parties intended the word "alteration" to modify the words "two 
pole and three pole structures." Thus "alteration" means change or substitution of a 
part Q{ the structures, but cannot be construed to mean that the structures may be 
removed and something entirely different erected in their place. 
In its reply brief, PacifiCorp actually admits or provides authorities supporting 
each of these points, thereby establishing the reasonableness of Fox Ridge's 
interpretation and putting in doubt the reasonableness of PacifiCorp's. Each of these 
three points is discussed in turn below. 
i 
L The Parties to the Clark Easement Intended the Words Two 
Pole and Three Pole Structures to Refer to the Type of 
Structures UP&L Actually Erected. 
The words "two pole and three pole structures" refer to the particular type of 
structures UP&L actually erected. Fox Ridge Brief at 20-23. PacifiCorp effectively 
concedes this point in its brief, stating: "[Tjhis language was reference only to the 
type of structures that UP&L then intended (in 1957) to install upon the property." 
PacifiCorp Brief at 25. As this admission demonstrates, and given the types of 
structures UP&L actually installed in 1957, the parties understood exactly what type 
of structures the words "two pole" and "three pole" structures referred to — structures 
consisting of wooden poles with wooden cross members. Therefore, at the time, the 
meaning of the easement language was clear without further structure specifications. 
Had the parties intended theie would be no limitation as to the type of supporting 
structures UP&L could install, without regaid to height, girth, materials or number of 
conductois, the easement would have used general words such as "10 supporting 
structures" or "such supporting structures as are needed," and would have 
specifically provided for "enlargement" as did other casements 
1 he case of Houston Pipe Line Co v Duyet\ 374 S W 2d 662 (Texas 1964), is 
instinctive in this icgaid Ihcie, the utility argued that it could remove an 18-inch 
pipe and replace it with a 30-inch pipe when the casement in question allowed the 
utility to "lay, maintain, opeiate, icpan, d\K\ icmo\e a Pipe 1 me " I he utility 
aigued that if the landowneis did not want the pipe to be increased in si/e to serve the 
giowing needs oi changing cucumstances of gas consumption it was incumbent on 
them to restrict as much in the easement language. Id. at 665. The court rejected that 
argument and instead observed that an easement contained on a printed form of the 
defendant utility, as was the case with the Clark Easement, must be construed against 
the defendant. In reaching this conclusion, the court correctly distinguished another 
case and observed: 
In that case the language of the grant clearly gave the grantee a right in 
excess of the one actually used, whereas, there is no language in the 
present agreement which can be construed to permit the grantee a right 
in excess of the right actually used, that is the right to increase the size 
of the pipe in excess of 18 inches in diameter. . . . 
[Djefendant in the present case, due to demands for gas, has replaced 
the pipe originally installed with pipe of greater carrying capacity. . . . 
The replacement of the old 18-inch line with a 30-inch line necessitated 
the digging of a ditch some 36 to 40 inches in width, thereby widening 
the ditch as well as placing the pipe approximately two feet deeper than 
it was in the original ditch. 
If defendant is correct in its contention that the 1926 agreement 
authorized an increase in the size of the pipeline every time an 
increased demand for gas made such enlargement necessary,, the extent 
of the easement could never become fixed or definitely ascertainable. 
Although there is no limitation on the size of the pipe to be laid, it does 
not necessarily follow that the parties, for a consideration of $32.00, 
intended to burden their land with an easement which might be 
enlarged over and over again, as often as an increase in demand for gas 
might make it necessary. 
Id. at 665. 
As in Dwyer, Judge Harding should have noted the absence of express 
language authorizing the larger structure and not placed the onus on the grantors, as 
he effectively did, of exacting more explicit limitations on the PacifiCorp form 
document. PacifiCorp had available to it the powers of condemnation to achieve the 
purpose that the (lark Easement language did not. Sec, e.#, Missouri Public Scrv. 
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lii bun . ;- ' mil Liml IIIII i pol< sin ictures" to refer 
" *
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exclude • u n e plausible interpretation of the 
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structures the easement specifically allows are the very type of "two and three pole 
structures" that UP&L intended to, and actually did erect. Beyond that, as PacifiCorp 
acknowledges, the parties intended that larger structures would not be allowed. At 
the very least, there is ambiguity on this point, necessitating trial on the merits to 
determine the parties' intentions regarding the type of structures the parties intended 
to exclude in striking the word "towers." 
3. PacifiCorp's Steel Towers Are Not "Altered" Two Pole and 
Three Pole Structures. 
PacifiCorp's authorities also support Fox Ridge's argument that the word 
"alteration" does not permit the removal of the two and three pole structures and the 
installation of steel towers in their place PacifiCorp quotes Webster's New Universal 
Unabudgcd Dictionary as defining the word "alter" to mean: "to make different in 
some paiticular, as size, style, couisc, 01 the like." PacifiCorp Brief at 27. This 
definition means to make a particulai (lung different, not to remove a thing and put a 
\ciy differ cut thing in its place PacifiCoip's case authontics underscore this point. 
For example, in Boston & Albany R Co v Department of Public Utilities, 51 N E.2d 
445, 447 (Mass 1943), the couit states that "[a]n alteration when used m tcfeicncc to 
a stiuctuic usually denotes a change oi substitution made /// a paituulai pan of a 
stiuctuie " (hnplusis added ) Similarly, Stow \ Wood 199 N W 2d 323, 327 
(Iowa 1972) states that dn "alteration" is "a vanation, changing, making diffeient, a 
change of a thing fiom one (oim oi stale to another, a change oi substitution in a 
substantial paiticular of one pan of the building, an installation that changes its 
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I o I' id<v ' M I I uinai * judgment motion. 
B. PacifiCorp's Steel Towers Place an Impermissible Burden on the 
Servient Estate, 
PacifiCorp argues that the rights granted under the Clark Easement measure 
the burden that can be permissibly placed on the servient estate, not the extent to 
which PacifiCorp may have exercised those rights. Thus, the argument goes, Fox 
Ridge's own changed use of the property cannot diminish PacifiCorp's rights, and 
any discussion of "setbacks" or Fox Ridge's loss of residential lots as a result of 
PacifiCorp's installation of tall steel towers is, according to PacifiCorp, irrelevant. 
PacifiCorp Brief at 28-29. 
The fact is, however, that the taller towers do increase the burden on Fox 
Ridge's property, and Fox Ridge has presented evidence to that effect. It must be 
remcmbcicd that PacifiCorp owns nothing more than an easement, and that Fox 
Ridge owns fee simple to both the easement corridor and the adjoining property. The 
Claik Easement giants PacifiCoip only a 50-foot corridor. It is unreasonable to 
intcrpict the casement in a fashion that allows PacifiCorp to install structures of such 
impact that they substantially burden 01 restrict Fox Ridge's use of its property 
outside the casement corridor. Thus Fox Ridge's setback evidence is both relevant 
and pcisuasive evidence of the panics' intention to limit the size of the stiuctuics 
PacifiCoip could cicct within the casement corridor And, as shown above, 
PacifiCoip itself acknowledges some intended limitation on burden by its admission 
that the pailies may ha\e intended to exclude lattice toweis As Fox Ridge pointed 
out in lis opening bnef the Claik I asemenl manifests the parties' intention (1) that 
X 
IW ' Ii1' '"'i"" .' |K ipilual easement and iighl ul \\d\ loi elaliic transmission 
lines and (2) that mef >; i i;, and 
type of supporting structures and also providing for a nai row casement corridoi 'I o 
I.-.., ; .-. rourt may considei tl ic additional bi irden PacifiCorp's 
steel towci s impu.»i r,|>i\ullv iiv<h lh.il lli ' lnl I asnirnl * hiignar/ 15 
ambiguous ai be ; a 10 v.hcthci -IM I= ijilei towers will be allowed. Tl ic most 
; .:, ..,ii-:- t <eipie:ui:oi . .i- i Jfoment is that the burden imposed by the 
significantly taller . i. 
This eonchrion lino supp^; m il._ case on which PacifiCorp relies most 
i . ..,..,. , ..... t ( VJ'71 v Silver Lake Homeowners As^ '//, 727 So 2d 1 r -0 'H.-
U. 
t" M- «h>^  \. j : ' a gaiiiol l!i«_ powci coinpan) on a vote ul 2-i. w mi little ana^' " 
the appellate majority ruled that the subject casement gave the powei company f the 
language; "the right to pa.u;., aspect, alter and impure, icpaii and rebuild the same 
and to remove such lines, wires, poles, attachment. »- ju :»ment and accessoi ies, 
n tagc . . 
'lln' I loiida ("oint\ opinion deserve. 1 , .* «.v , ^v..^..^ i^cause it lacks analysis 
ai . i.als to j»i\M* efleri to ea4^nvvnt language spccifvi -^ i*r r ic strut:ltires, contiaiy 
IU Hi 
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<) 
In a strong dissent, Justice Sharp provided analysis lacking in the majority 
opinion that is relevant here. He noted that an easement cannot unreasonably burden 
the servient estate and concluded (hat the burden analysis is factual in nature, given 
the circumstances. See id. at 115 L Justice Sharp then observed: 
In this case the trial judge concluded, based on the pleadings 
and affidavits in the record, that Florida Power had exceed the scope of 
the 1948 easement it had been granted by constructing a steel monopole 
transmission/distribution line in place of the H-frame line. The H-
frame structures were approximately 40 feet high. The monopoles are 
110 feet high - almost triple the size of the H-framcs. And the 
easement is surrounded by residential property owners. As a matter of 
logic, one could conclude that the unsightliness of the taller power 
structures have or will have a greater adverse impact, from an aesthetic 
point of view, on the residential owners, for which compensation 
should be awarded. 
I disagree with the majority opinion in its view that the 
easement in this case gave Florida Power the absolute right to construct 
the towers in place of the H-frames merely because the easement, also 
permitted Florida power to improve, rebuild, and repair the H frames, 
and to increase the number of wires and voltage. Nor do I think the 
fact that the towers were placed within the easement area described by 
the casement document ipso facto allows the replacement of the H 
frames with much larger structures. If that is true, then there is no limit 
to the size of the transmission structures that can be built in the interest 
of bigger and better distribution of electrical power. In the alternative, 
whether these much-larger structures constitute an over-burden or 
excessive use of the casement should at least be resolved in the context 
of a fact finding hearing or trial. 
Id. at 1 151-52 (emphasis added). K this Court gives any weight to Florida Power, it 
should follow Justice Sharp's better-reasoned dissenting opinion. The only 
icasonable interpretation of the (lark Fascment is that the parties intended to limit the 
iCMKIiiniii! discs l \ i a h ( oip cites do iiol contain such woids of limitation and thcicforc aic not particuLilly 
mslmcm c u ilh icuaid to llie issues heloie this ( ouit 
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size and type of structures within the easement corridor and thereby to limit the 
burden on the servient estate. Strict construction of the Clark Easement permits only 
two and three pole structures, the only type of structures plainly provided for, and 
thus permitted, under the easement. At the very least, this Court should reverse for 
trial on whether PacifiCorp's steel towers impermissibly burden the servient estate. 
II. JUDGE HARDING INCORRECTLY DECIDED EVIDENTIARY 
ISSUES, 
The foregoing sections of this brief demonstrates that the easement language 
must either be found unambiguous in favor of Fox Ridge, or ambiguous on its face 
such that a trial is required. If the Court docs not find the easement unambiguous in 
Fox Ridge's favor, Fox Ridge is entitled to the admission of extrinsic evidence either 
resolve ambiguity or to demonstrate that ambiguity exists. Ward v. Intermountain 
Farmers, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995) Thus the improperly excluded evidence is 
relevant to this appeal if it demonstrates the existence of ambiguity, or resolves 
ambiguity in Fox Ridge's favoi Although determination of the admissibility of 
evidence on remand is important, if the Court finds the plain language of the Clark 
Easement to be ambiguous, Fox Ridge must be given its day in court regardless of the 
Court's determination on any of the evidentiary issues presented in this appeal Given 
the lack of any formal discovery and acccleiatcd briefing schedule below, on icmand 
I o\ Ridge must be given the oppoitunity to conduct discoveiy and piesent evidence 
in the c\ent that the Com I does not find in la\oi of l*o\ Ridge as a mallei ol law 
A- The Proper Standard of Review is Correctness-
In its brief, PacifiCorp incorrectly contends that abuse of discretion is the 
proper standard of review for all of Judge Harding's evidentiary determinations. See 
Appellee's Brief at 2. Questions of admission of evidence, especially those as here 
dealing with Rules 408, 802, 803, and 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, are subject 
to a de novo standard of review where the appellate court reviews for correctness. 
E.g., Spears v. Wan, 44 P.3d 742 (Utah 2002) (determinations of extrinsic evidence 
reviewed for correctness); Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 977 P.2d 474 
(Utah 1999) ("The admissibility of an item of evidence a legal question"); Child v. 
Newsom, 972 P 2d 425, 428-29 (Utah 1998) (interpretation of Rule 408 as part of jury 
instruction leviewed for correctness), State v Webster, 32 P 3d 976 (Utah Ct. App. 
2001) (inteipicting and applying a rule of evidence, including RUIQ 804(b)(5), 
constitutes a conclusion of law ievicwcd for correctness), cf Stale v Doporto, 935 
P 2d 486, 489 & n4 (Utah 1997) (cntici/mg the argument that all evidentiary 
decisions of the tnal couit aic to be accoided discietion) Hansen v Heath, 852 P 2d 
977, 978-79 (Utah 1993) These decisions establish that this Court should review 
Judge Haidmg's cxidcntiaiy iulings on motions to stnke for coirectncss 
B. Judge Harding Erred in Striking the 2000 Fox Ridge Kasemcnt. 
PacifiCoip argues that Rule 408 bais the admission of the 2000 Fox Ridge 
1 ascment because PauiiC oip olfeied that document to I ox Ridue in An attempt to 
settle this dispute shoil ol litigation Pacific oip Bnel at 36 As it has thioughout this 
case, howexei, PaufiCoip omits to disclose the matenal fact that PacifiCoip's 
1 1 
representatives, including its attorney, Jeff Richards, offered the 2000 Fox Ridge 
Easement to Fox Ridge's during the first discussion the parties had on the subject of 
the Clark Easement. Tr. 949-51; Fox Ridge Brief at 41-42. Thus, at the time 
PacifiCorp offered the 2000 Fox Ridge Easement to Fox Ridge, there was no dispute 
and therefore Rule 408 does not apply 
Courts have held that similar offers do not constitute offers of compromise 
subject to Rule 408. For example, in S.A. Healy Co. v Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage 
Dist., 50 F.3d 476 (7lh Cir. 1995), a city sewage authority unsuccessfully appealed a 
judgment in favor of a contractor, Healy, who claimed that a price adjustment was in 
order after encountering greater water flows than the parties expected relative to 
performance of a sewage contract. The trial court admitted a statement from the 
city's engineer, prior to the city taking a position that it would not allow the price 
adjustment, that the price adjustment "probably has ment " Rejecting the city's claim 
that Rule 408 excluded this statement as part of a series of compiomise negotiations, 
the couit explained 
A dispute arises only when a claim is rejected at the initial oi 
some subsequent level Had the sewage authority accepted Healy's 
claim foi a price adjustment, no dispute would have arisen And it 
follows that until the rejection of that claim, no dispute had arisen 
When the engineer remarked to Healy that its claim probably had merit, 
the claim had not yet been rejected 'Ihcie was not yet a dispute and 
Rule 408 was inapplicable 
Id at 4X0 
Similai is (nccnslicct \ Ihown, 623 A 2d 1270 (Maine 1993) Ihcic, a 
di\oice lawyer knew that he had committed malpractice in killing to contest a motion 
n 
to amend a divorce decree. Upon learning of the amended judgment after sale of the 
marital home, the client phoned the attorney who responded that "he had made a 
mistake by not opposing the motion to amend and that he would pay Greenstreet 
money to make amends for his conduct." Id. at 1272. The court rejected the lawyer's 
argument that Rule 408 protected the statement since, after all, the attorney knew of 
the dispute when making the statement, explaining: 
Neither an offer to compromise nor compromise negotiations 
may take place, however, in the absence of a dispute. . . . Here, 
Brown's statement informed Greenstreet for the first time about facts 
that might give rise to a claim. Since there is no evidence that a dispute 
existed about the validity of a claim or the amount claimed at the time 
of Brown's admission, the trial court properly admitted Brown's 
statement m evidence. 
Id. 
These cases demonstrate that, for Rule 408 to apply, the allegedly privileged 
statements must occur after a dispute or controversy arises. Here, there was no 
dispute until PacifiCorp presented the 2000 Fox Ridge Basement and Fox Ridge 
subsequently rejected it. If Mr. Chnstenscn had accepted and agreed to execute the 
2000 \:ox Ridge Casement, there would have been no dispute. The dispute in fact 
arose lata, after Fox Ridge rejected PacifiCorp's offer. Since there was no dispute at 
the time PacifiCorp offeied the 2000 Fox Ridge basement, as S A. Ilealy and 
(jivcnstrect demonstrate, Rule 408 docs not apply Therefore, Judge Harding erred in 
sinking the 2000 Pox Ridue Pasemcnl 
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C Judge Harding Erred in Striking the Christensen and Tolbert 
Affidavits. 
PacifiCorp argues that the James Christensen and Rustin Tolbert affidavits 
"are extrinsic to the Easements and are entirely irrelevant to the interpretation of the 
intent of the parties." Appellee's Brief at 39. This argument appears to be based on 
the assumption that the language of the Clark Easement is unambiguous, and 
therefore no extrinsic evidence may be admitted. As with other extrinsic evidence, 
however, the Christensen and Tolbert affidavits may be relevant in at least the 
following respects: 
(1) The affidavits provide evidence of the significantly increased setback 
requirements and other burdens that may indicate, among other things, that in 
establishing a 50-foot wide easement corridor the parties necessarily intended to limit 
the size of supporting stiucturcs This may both help establish and resolve ambiguity. 
(2) The affidavits may assist the fact finder in determining whether the 
pioposed changed use of the easement will unreasonably burden the servient estate 
beyond the Clark Easement's express grant. See Florida Power, 727 So.2d at 1151, 
1152 (dissenting opinion) ("whether these much-larger structures constitute an over-
burden or excessive use of the easement should at least be resolved in the context of a 
fact finding hearing or trial") Id at 1 1 52 (dissenting opinion) 
As stated in Fox Ridge's opening brief both Mi Christensen and Mi Tolbert 
provided affidavit testimony bused on then personal knowledge as developer and 
home-builder, respectively I-ox Ridge agrees, however, that 'I iactus was never 
properly joined as a party and therefore evidence in Mr Christensen's affidavit 
regarding Tractus' damages may be stricken. 
D. Judge Harding Erred in Striking the Carlson Easement 
The Carlson Easement should be admitted for evidence of the type of language 
PacfiCorp has included in easements that may accomplish the result it seeks here. 
That easement, as does the modified Beck Easement granted by Micron, expressly 
allows "enlargement" of supporting structures and circuits. As shown in Fox Ridge's 
opening brief, the easement is admissible despite passage of time because subsequent 
acts of the parties are admissible to resolve or even show ambiguity. Ward v. 
Intermountain Fanners, 907 P.2d at 268. Comparison of casements drafted by 
PacifiCorp that contain different language manifests PacifiCorp's own understanding 
and intent regarding the meaning of easement language. See, e.g., Florida Power, 727 
So.2d at 1152 (dissenting opinion) ("The [trial] court noted that other power 
casements for lands in Seminole County, Florida ... - all drafted by Florida Power 
during the past 40 years - specifically identify the kind of transmission structure 
intended. . . . The court determined that specific references have specific meanings 
and that a change upward constitutes an over-burden [absent language explicitly 
allowing as much].11). 
E. Judge Harding Erred in Striking S. Kcnly Clark's Affidavit. 
PacifiCorp aigucs against admission of the S. Kcnly (lark affidavit with the 
caution that "(t]his case should not be the fust case in which a Utah appellate court 
approves the admission of evidence under the residual exceptions " PacifiCorp Brief 
I A 
at 34. This reasoning is unpersuasive, as it would write the exceptions out of the 
statute, contrary to legislative intent. 
The Clark affidavit should be admitted because it meets the requirements of 
the Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5) residual exceptions In the cases PacifiCorp 
cites, those requirements weie not met For example, in State v Webster, 32 P.3d 976 
(Utah App. 2001) and State v. Nelson, 111 P.2d 479, 482 (Utah 1989), either more 
reliable witnesses were available on the point in question or the prior notice 
component of the rule was not satisfied (PacifiCorp concedes proper notice here; 
PacifiCorp Brief at 31) Othci cases involved situations where cross-examination was 
not possible, unlike the instant case 
Webstet instructed consideration of eight factors for admission of evidence 
undci Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5), all of which favoi admission qf the Clark 
affidavit (1) motive of declarant, (2) circumstances of making the statement, (3) 
knowledge/qualification of declarant, (4) character of declarant foi truthfulness, (5) 
whether the statement was given voluntarily under oath, (6) the extent the statement 
reflects personal knowledge, (7) whether the declarant ever recanted the statement, 
and (8) whether declarant's statement was insufficiently corroborated S Kcnly Clark 
has no financial state in the case and no motivation to lie, made his statements 
\oluntanly, gives no indication of lack of trustworthiness, declares information that 
he learned fiisthand and ne\ei has recanted Allhouuh the passage of time and the 
inheient natuie of hearsay may go to the weight of Mr ( lark s testimony, it should be 
admitted At trial theie will be ample opportunity for cross examination 
HI. JUDGE HARDING ERRED IN DENYING FOX RIDGE'S RULE 56(0 
MOTION. 
PacifiCorp cites authorities indicating that a trial court's decision to grant or 
deny a Rule 56(f) motion is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, citing, 
primarily, Crossland Savings v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994). Under that 
standard, an appellate court will not reverse "unless the decision exceeds the limits of 
reasonability." Id. While Fox Ridge concedes that abuse of discretion is the correct 
standard of review relative to review of Rule 56(f) determinations, as noted above the 
Supreme Court of Utah has made clear that not all abuse of discretion review is equal 
See Doporto, 935 P.2d at 489 & n.4. Abuse of discretion in the context of denial of a 
Rule 56(f) motion affords only slightly greater deference than a correctness standard 
since the relevant query is "does the grant or denial exceed 'the limits of 
rcasonabl^y?'" Price Dew Co. v. Orem City, 200 UT 26,1| 9, 995 P.2d'l237 (Utah 
2000). Moreover, "to provide an adequate opportunity for discovery, the trial court 
should liberally grant rule 56(1) motions unless they are 'dilatory or lacking merit.'" 
Id. at |^ 30 (reversing trial court's grant of Rule 56(0 motion based in part on the 
complexity of the transaction there involved). 
Undci this softened abuse of discretion standard, Judge Harding erred in 
denying Fox Ridge's Rule 56(f) motion. In its opening brief, Fox Ridge describes 
evidence that may have been available had it been granted the opportunity to conduct 
discoveiy. Given questions iegaiding the meaning of such words as "two and thiee 
pole slructwes," "towers," and "alteration," there may well have been internal 
i v 
PacifiCorp documents, recorded easements or other evidence shedding light on the 
meaning of those words in their historical context. As stated, this matter was 
conducted on a fast track, with judgment rendered within 60 days of PacifiCorp's 
filing of its complaint, and Fox Ridge was significantly prejudiced by its inability to 
conduct formal discovery. As a matter of fairness, Fox Ridge should have been 
allowed time to conduct discovery that may have either demonstrated or resolved 
ambiguity regarding the scope of the Clark Easement. 
In an extended footnote, PacifiCorp criticizes Fox Ridge for its delay in 
presenting this case for appeal. PacifiCorp Brief at 43-44 n. 9. Yet Fox Ridge could 
not do so until the case was ripe for appeal. That did not occur until Judge Schofield 
dismissed the RDA claims without prejudice. Fox Ridge considered many of the 
options PacifiCorp identifies in its footnote, but there is no record before t}ie Court on 
such matters and there was no ability to appeal the interlocutory decision until the 
final dismissal was entered at which time this appeal was timely filed See, eg., 
Bemuon v Pennzoil Co , 826 P.2d 137, 138 (Utah 1992) (claims are not separate to 
allow a Rule 54(b) certification if there is such overlap of remaining claims as to have 
potential ics judicata effect on claims decided) The question of delay is simply not at 
issue heie I o\ Ridge timely filed its appeal once it was entitled to do so which is all 
that is icquiied of it, and PacifiCorp docs not argue otherwise See. eg, Bogue v 
4me\ (ml Sen (omm , 368 N W 2d III , 114 (Iowa 1985) (availability of 
altcinati\c route of appeal through available statutoiy proxision was irrelevant since 
certiorari appeal at a later time also was proper method to raise the issue with the 
10 
appellate court). The only questions presented on this appeal relate to Judge 
Harding's decisions regarding the scope of the Clark Easement on the cross motions 
for summary judgment, his rulings on evidence, and his lack of procedural fairness in 
denying Fox Ridge the opportunity to conduct discovery and to be heard on the 
motions it presented, including its motion for summary judgment on the RDA claims. 
To the extent PacifiCorp erected steel poles in reliance on Judge Harding's 
order, without waiting for final disposition of this case, it did so at its own risk. See, 
e.g., Boston Edison Co. v. Town of Sudbury, 253 N.E.2d 850 (Mass. 1969) (dissolving 
injunction that prevented construction of overhead power lines and acknowledging 
that power company could continue construction of same if "prepared to take the risks 
of later disapprovals" by the court). By its admission, it did so immediately following 
Judge Harding's ruling, leaving Fox Ridge no effective recourse but to take an appeal 
once it had the right to do so. The practical consequence of PacifiCorp's action is that 
it faces the potential either of being ordered to remove the steel towers or of paying 
damages for over-burdening Fox Ridge's property. Those, however, are issues for 
another day. The central question before this Court is simply whether PacifiCorp's 
erection of steel towers exceeds its rights under the Clark Eascmcnl. Judge Harding 
erroneously answered this question m direct contravention of the Clark Easement 
language. 
CONCLUSION 
Foi reasons slated above and in its opening bnef, Fox Ridge respectfully 
icquests that the Court. 
20 
L Reverse the grant of PacifiCorp's motion for summary judgment; 
2. Reverse the denial of Fox Ridge's motion for summary judgment; 
3. Reverse the grant of PacifiCorp's motions to strike; and 
4. To the extent not mooted by the foregoing, grant Fox Ridge's Rule 
56(f) motion for continuance. 
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